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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE BANK OF LEHI, 
a Utah corporation, 
vs. 
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RALPH o. WOOLSEY and 
SYLVIA W. WOOLSEY, 
Defendants-
Appel lan ts. 
Case No. 14,719 
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APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT BY THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
HONORABLE J. ROBERT BULLOCK, JUDGE 
HEBER GRANT IVINS 
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American Fork, Utah 84003 
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BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to declare certain notes in default 
and to foreclose a security interest held by the plaintiff-
respondent in the real and personal property which con-
stitutes the defendant-appellants mink ranch, located on 
Saratoga Road near Lehi, Utah and a mortgage on defendants, 
Sylvia Woolsey's home. The appellants claim that the trial 
court erred in several respects in granting judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff-respondent and that .the trial judge 
erred in ruling that the plaintiff-respondent had not acted 
wrongfully in declaring a default and having a receiver ap-
pointed. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After a trial on the merits, the trial court entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which allowed the 
plaintiff-respondent to foreclose its security interests. '1'he 
trial court had previously permitted the ex parte appointment 
of a receiver, who has continued in possession of the pro-
perty until a sale was held pursuant to the foreclosure decree. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek to have this Court reverse certain 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the trial 
court and to enter judgment against the respondent and for Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the appellants or, in the alternative, to remand this matte: 
to the trial court for further hearings on the matter A 
• P· 
pellants request this Court to order that the issues of fact 
in the further hearings be heard and decided by a jury, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellants, Ralph O. Woolsey and Sylvia Grossge-
bauer Woolsey, were the owners and operators of a mink ranch 
near Lehi, Utah. To finance the expansion and operation of 
the mink ranch, the appellants had obtained several loans 
from the respondent, the State Bank of Lahi. 
question were made on June 19, 1974, July 3, 
12, 1975. The appellants pledged all of the 
property which constituted the mink ranch as 
The loans in I 
19 7 5, and Decetj 
personal and r~~ 
security for I 
these loans. In addition, Mrs. Woolsey' s interest in a 
home in Provo, Utah, was mortgaged as additional security 
for the 1974 loan. The parties disagree as to the terms for I 
the release of the security interest in that home. 
In December of 1975, approximately 981 mink pelts were 
stolen from the Woolsey ranch. These pelts were insured 
and the insurance proceeds have subsequently been paid. 
On January 2, 1976, the Bank obtained the appointment 
of a receiver to take possession of the mink ranch and to 
manage it. This was done at an ex parte hearing and no noti' 
was given to the appellants prior to the receiver's arrival 
at the ranch to take possession. The appointment of the 
receiver was based on the Bank's declaration of default on 
f · due to the theft the grounds that it deemed itsel insecure 
of the pelts. The appellants have alleged 
-2-
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no valid basis for the default or the appointment of the 
receiver and that the same were not done in good faith. 
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
The appellants argue on appeal that the trial court 
erred as a matter of law in striking their demand for a 
jury trial and in ordering appellant Sylvia Woolsey's tes-
timony concerning fraud stricken from the record as violative 
of the parol evidence rule. The appellants also argue that 
the trial court erred in failing to find that the parties 
had agreed to extend the payment of the $115,000 note to March 
1, 1976, erred in finding that the plaintiff properly ac-
celerated the payments due under the notes, and that the 
defendants (appellants} had not established a lack of good 
faith in declaring a default under the security agreement. 
Appellants believe that all of the factual findings were 
against the clear weight of the evidence. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL. 
On June 9, 1976, the trial court granted the plaintiff's 
motion to strike the defendants' demand for a jury trial. 
(R. 57) The order granting the motion gave the following as 
the grounds for denying the defendants their right to a jury 
trial: 
This Order is based upon the finding by 
this Court that the issues to be decided are 
largely equitable and arise from an interpre-
tation of written contracts and therefore the 
defendants are not entitled to a jury trial. 
(R. 57) 
-3-
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As the appellants will show, this finding was erroneous 
the trial court improperly precluded the defendants 
-appe1. 
lants from presenting their case to a jury. 
A review of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Iov 
entered in this action will readily disclose that the gr eat;, 
number of issues in this matter were factual and not equital' 
in nature. (R. 43-49) The findings of fact, seventeen in 
number, take approximately four full pages to enumerate, 
while the conclusions of law, ten in number, take only two 
and a half. Not only are the factual issues more numerous, 
but their determination is the crucial factor in this case 
and the conclusions of law are merely subsidiary to those 
fact questions. This is illustrated by the following exampl 
1. As shown in Point II, it was an essential fact 
question whether or not the parties had made an oral agree· 
ment to extend the time for payment of the $l15, 000 note to 
March 1, 1976. This fact was critical to the determination 
of the respondent's rights to declare the notes in default 
as ruled in Findings 2ta) and 9. 
The existence of such an agreement was obviously, a 
fact question to be decided by a jury. This matter was not 
"entirely founded in the interpretation of legal documents', 
or in giving legal effect to such instruments. There were 
valid fact questions in this case which the appellants were 
constitutionally and statutorily entitled to have submitted 
a jury. U.C.A. §78-21-2 (1953). 
2. The findings of fact concerning the 
ment of the mink ranch and the other grounds 
-4-
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alleged by the Bank were obviously important in determining 
whether or not it had acted in good faith in declaring the 
notes to be in default and in having a receiver appointed. 
3. The most important determination made by the trial 
court was a fact question; i.e. did the Bank act in good 
faith in declaring the debtors (appellants) to be in default? 
This issue is determinative of most of the important issues 
in this case. 
The question of good faith in accelerating notes which 
are due "on or before" a certain date (as are those in this 
case} has always been a jury question under the provisions 
of the u.c.c. Although this issue has not been treated by 
the Utah Supreme Court, the courts of other states appear to 
be unanimous in this matter. In Fort Knox National Bank 
v. Gustafson, 385 S.W.2d 196 (1964), the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals ruled that the question of "good faith"-. under the 
section in question (analogue to u.c.A. §70A~l-208) is 
required to be submitted to the jury unless there is no 
competent evidence to support such a finding. Universal C.I.T 
Credit Corp. v. Shepler, 329 N.E.2d 620 (Ind. 1975) also 
recognizes that the question of good faith is a jury question. 
Because this fact question, as well as the others listed 
above, was of such crucial importance in the resolution of 
this matter, the appellants assert that the trial court's 
ruling was clearly erroneous and that the appellants were 
wrongfully denied their right to a jury trial. 
The right to a jury trial has always been jealously 
guarded in this State and the appellants believe that the 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trial court ignored firm precedent in striking their demand 
for a J'ury trial. The appell t b l' an s e ieve that the case of 
Petty v. Clark, 102 Utah 186, 129 P.2d 568 (1942) is con-
trolling in this matter and that the rationale of that case 
affirms the appellants' argument that they were entitled to 
a jury trial. In the Petty case, there was only one fact is. 
raised in a foreclosure action, which is similar to the 
facts in the present case except that there were fewer fact 
issues. In Petty, the history of equitable and legal 
pleadings were reviewed and then this Court found that the 
existence of one fact issue was enough to entitle the defen· 
dant to a jury trial: 
At common law, law and equity were administered 
by different courts. In courts of law, the par-
ties were entitled to a jury to determine issues 
of fact, but in courts which administered equity, 
.there was no jury. Often the courts of equity 
required parties to litigate certain issues in 
the law courts before equity would intervene, 
and in many instances it required two suits to 
determine what is now determined in only one 
suit. 
Under the common-law system, two suits 
would have been required to determine this 
action: (1) a suit in the law court to deter-
rnind the amount owing under the contract; (2) 
if the judgment for that amount were not paid, 
the plaintiff would be required to go into a 
court of equity to foreclose the defendant's 
equity of redemption. 
Under the Utah Constitution and Statutes, 
there is but one form of civil action-the same 
court administers both law and equity, often in 
the same action. Constitution of Utah, Article 
VIII §19; Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 104-
1-2. In order to prevent more than one action 
in the foreclosure of mortgages, the legislature 
in 104-55-1 expressly provides: "There can be 
but one action for the recovery of any debt or 
the enforcement of any right secured by mort-
gage* * *·" 
-6-
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The legi~lature thus contemplated the join-
ing of an ac~ion at law and a suit in equity in 
the same action. 
* * * In ~he present case the only disputed issue 
of fact in the case, and the one which was sub-
mitted to the jury, is whether the interest para-
graph was a part of the contract when it was de-
livered. That issue was a part of plaintiff's 
main action to recover money owing under the con-
tract, which action is clearly an action at law. 
The mere fact that plaintiff demanded equitable 
relief, to wit: the foreclosure of his lien-
would not deprive the defendant of his right to 
have the issue of fact determined by a jury. 
This holding directly opposes the holding of the trial court 
on this issue. (R. 241-242). In light of the facts that 
there were many factual issues in this case and tllat these 
were the predominant issues, this rationale is clearly 
applicable and demonstrates the error of the trial court in 
striking the defendants' demand for a jury. 
The Petty decision is clearly in line with other Utah 
cases which have consistently protected a citizens' riqht to 
a jury trial. Several of these cases have held that the 
right to a jury trial should be scrupulously guarded. See 
e.g. Butz v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 233 P. 2d 332 (Utah 
1951) and Stickle v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 251 P.2d H7 
(Utah 1952) • In the latter case, this Court gave the basis 
for the preservation of these rights: 
In our democratic system, the people are the 
repository of power whence the law is de-
rived; from its initiation and creation to 
its final application and enforcement, the 
law is the expression of their will. The 
functioning of a cross-section of the citi-
zenry as a jury is the method by whi~h t~e 
people express this will in the applicatio~ 
of law to controversies which arise under it. 
Both our constitutional and statutory provi-
sions assure trial by jury to citizens of this 
state. 
-7-
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Co~ts, as final arbiters of law, coul~ 
rogate to themselves arbitrary and dangerous : 
powers ~y pr~s:iming to determine questions of 
fact whi~h ~itigants have a right to have passed 
upon by.Ju~ies. Part of the merit of the jury 
system is its safeguarding against such arbi-
trary power in the courts. To the great credit 
of the courts of this country, they have been 
extremely reluctant to infringe upon this right 
and by leaving it unimpaired have kept the ad- ' 
ministration of justice close to the people. 
This rationale and holding of this case are found repeatedlr' 
I in other Utah cases. See Abdulkadir v. Wes tern Pacific Rail' 
road, 7 U.2d 53, 318 P.2d 339 (1957); Holland v. Wilson, a 
U.2d 11, 327 P.2d 250 (1958); Valley Mortuary v. Fairba~,1 
225 P.2d 739 (Utah 1950); and Corbet v. Cox, 30 U.2d 361, : 
517 P.2d 1318 (1974). Even though some of these cases uphell 
summary judgments or other judicial acts which would take 
the determination of a case from the jury, all of them gav€ 
the same standard. 
It is important to note that in this case the parties 
had progressed for four months in this case before the 
plaintiff made its motion to strike the defendant's request 
for a jury. The motion was made after the pre-trial con-
ference had been held and the court had issued a Pre-Trial 
Order dated March 12, 1976, which clearly anticipatedaj~ 
trial in this matter. (R. 74). It was months later that th! 
plaintiff made its motion to strike the defendants' demand. 
It would seem to the appellants that such conduct approxi· 
mates a waiver of any objection. 
In summary, the appellants believe that the trial cour: 
· when ~t struck the defendants' request was clearly in error ~ 
for a jury trial. That action was erroneous because there 
-8-
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were many issues of fact which the defendants were entitled 
to have decided by a jury and because the fact issues were 
clearly the major issues in this trial, even though the 
action was nominally an equitable one. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE 
PARTIES HAD ORALLY AGREED TO EXTEND THE DUE DATE OF THE 
$115,000 NOTE TO MARCH 1, 1976. 
The first fact issue to be considered will be whether 
or not the parties reached an oral agreement in July of 1975 
to extend the due date for a $115,000 note to March 1, 1976. 
This note was originally executed on June 19, 1974, and was 
due on or before February 20, 1975. (Plaintiff's Ex. 9, R. 
115} This question will be considered first because its 
resolution is fundamental to the succeeding points. 
The appellants believe that the evidence at the hearing 
of January 16, 1976 and at trial clearly showed that an oral 
agreement was reached in July of 1975 which gave the defen-
dants until March 1, of 1976 to pay a previously executed 
and overdue note in the amount of $115,000. This contention 
is based on several elements of testimony .and evidence: 
1. The testimony of the respondent-Bank's president, 
Calvin H. Swenson. 
2. Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, which is a security agree-
ment dated July 3, 1975. (R. 123-124) 
3. The testimony of the defendants, Ralph O. Woolsey 
and Sylvia W. Woolsey. 
The first element (the testimony of Mr. Swenson) is 
-9-
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probably the strongest support of the appellants• argUJUent, 
Mr. Swenson is the president of the State Bank of Lehi {the 
plaintiff in this action) and was the person with whom the 
plaintiffs had dealt for several years in obtaining loans 
for the construction and operation of their mink ranch, ~ 
his deposition, which was taken on March 11, 1976, Mr. 
Swenson clearly admits that the date of March 1, 1976, was 
established as the date for payment of the new note for 
$45,000 as.well as the old one for $115,000: 
Q. Was any mention made at this time of the 
$115,000 note? 
A. I don't recall the specific mention, but 
they were aware that there was still a carry-
over of $111,000 and that this was just in 
addition just to tide them through in the op-
erations this year. 
Q. And was it the position of the bank at 
this time that the $115,000 note and the 
$45,000 note would then all be due at the 
same time? 
A. Well, it was our intention that the $115,-
000 note - - it was our knowledge that that 
was past due and we agreed to carry that with 
them in its present state until such time as 
he could effect the refinancing. 
Q. Was the target date for that March 1, 1976? 
A. Well, we assumed that it would be necessary 
to get the mink pelts sold in order to know at 
that point just how we stood. 
Q. Is that why the March 1st date was arrived 
at? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was it because of your past experienc~hthat 
you knew that once the pelts are sent to e 
market, it takes a period of time befor; they're 
sold and before you get your money back. 
A. That's right. And it ~as Mr. Woolsey's in-
-10-
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tention to send the mink so they'd get in on 
the early sale. 
Q. And the early sale is the January sale? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you know that when the mink go in the 
January sale, that it is generally in mid or 
late February before payments are received? 
A. That's why we set the March 1st date. 
(emphasis added) (R. 125, pp. 52-53, and 
R. 294-296). 
Although Mr. Swenson attempted to hedge and. qualify these 
answers at trial, it is obvious from the deposition testi-
many that the Woolseys were given until March 1, ~976, to· 
~ •··, t 
repay all of the loans through receipt of incGJRe and by .. 
additional financing from other sources. (R. 136-137) .lk. 
Swenson tried to state at trial that the loan was to kaYe 
been refinanced during the pelting season. Such a statement 
is unreasonable in light of the fact that Mr. Swenson knew 
that the mink sale monies would not be received until late· 
February or early March and that it was highly unlikely that 
;,;,!) 
any institution would provide financing until. the outstanding. 
··~·-. !.. .l· l 
debt had been reduced by payments from the sale receipts. 
(See Swenson's testimony, R. 295-296). The predisposition of 
the trial. judge was evident from his statements at the first: .. 
hearing, which occurred before the issue was ever in questioa. 
(R. 210-211). Thus, the right to a jury trial was clearly 
essential. 
The appellants' contention is also supported by the 
Security Agreement which was executed by the parties on July 
3, 1975. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, also reproduced at R. 123-
..:11-
. ~ 
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124) This agreement specified that it is to secure the 
payment of the old and new loans, including the $115,ooo 
note which had been overdue since February 20, 1975. (R. 
115). It is of critical importance to note that the bank 
did not foreclose the $115,000 note in July of 1975, but 
chose instead to loan the appellants another $51,000 fortli 
coming year. Both of the new notes which were executed 
pursuant to this Security Agreement were due on March 1, 
1976, which was the date Mr. Swenson testified was the 
target date for refinancing. 
Both of the defendants testified that an express oral 
agreement was entered into which gave the Woolsey$ until 
March 1 to pay off the loan which was overdue. 
testified that Mr. Swenson agreed to extend the 
the "big loan" to the time when the new, $45,000 
Mr. Woolseil 
due date of 
! 
note woulc 
be due (R. 350) and that the Bank was willing to work with 
him one hundred percent (R. 185) and Mrs. Woolsey testifi~1 
that the old note "would be extended for a year with the nJ 
note". {R. 468) • Both of the defendants testified that 1111 
collateral was pledged as consideration for the extension. 
CR. 351, 468). 
Appellants contend that, inasmuch as the above three 
witnesses were the only ones that testified concerning the 
transactions of the parties, their testimony obviously 
constitutes the clear weight of the evidence and that such 
the Bank (through Mr. Swenson! evidence clearly showed that 
granted the Woolseys until March 1, 1976 to obtain 
and to pay off the $115,000 which 
-12-
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several years. The failure of the trial court to so find is 
clearly error and, because such a finding would substantially 
affect the other findings in the matter, the failure con-
stitutes reversible error by the trial court. 
The appellants believe that the majority of legal 
authorities support the propriety of such a mutual extension 
agreement. Anderson in his treatise, the Uniform Commercial 
~· states, on page 659 of §3-109:19, that a contract for 
extension of time may be either written or oral. 11 Am.Jur2d, 
Bills and Notes, §298, p. 326 states that such an agreement 
is a separate contract and is governed by the law of contract 
and is not regulated by the Uniform Commercial Code. The 
appellants contend that the evidence establishes such a 
contract and that the consideration for the extension was 
furnished by the additional collateral which was listed in 
the 1975 security agreement. 
Appellants believe that the above.clearly shows that 
the parties agreed to extend the due date for the $115,000 
note to March 1, 1976, and that such an extension is clearly 
legal. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
PROPERLY ACCELERATED THE PAYMENTS DUE UNDER THE NOTES AND 
THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAD NOT ESTABLISHED A LACK OF GOOD FAITH 
IN DECLARING A DEFAULT UNDER THE SECURITY AGREEMENT. 
Having previously established that the parties had 
reached an agreement which made all of the notes due on 
March 1, 1976, the appellants now desire to show that the 
-13-
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plaintiff-respondent had no right to accelerate the date 
payment of the notes and that their actions in so 
not in good faith as required by Utah statute and 
case law. 
general 
The first issue concerns the right of the respondent, 
State Bank of Lehi, to accelerate the notes and to declare 
them due and owing on January 2, 1976. (See the complaint 
in this action, R. 113). 
Both the testimony at trial and the great weight of 
legal authority show that notes such as those in this acfa 
are not demand notes. The Secured Promissory Notes which 
were executed on July 3 , 19 7 5 (for $ 4 5, 0 0 0) and on December 
12, 1975 (for $6,000) stated that they were payable "on or 
before March 1, 1976". The great majority of jurisdiction; 
I 
which have ruled on such notes have held they they are not 
demand notes but, rather, that they are notes which are due 
on a date certain. See e • g • Mecham v. United States Bank 
of Arizona, 107 Ariz. 437, 489 P.2d 247 (1971) which statee 
that "when a note, such as this one, provides for payment 1 
or before a stated date, it is payable at a definite time'. 
To the same effect is Ferri v. Sylvia, 214 A.2d 470 (R.I. 
1965) which states that "at the law merchant it was gener · 
settled that a promissory note or a bill of exchange payal~ 
'on or before' a specified date fixed with certainty the 
time of payment" and then cites five other cases from as 
many jurisdictions as authority for that proposition. ~u 
is established in Utah under U .C .A. §70A-3-109 (a) which 
states: 
-14-
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r 
70A-3-109. Definite time. - (1) An instrument 
is payable at a definite time by its terms it 
is payable 
(a) on or before a stated date or at a fixed 
period after a stated date; • • ·• 
These authorities clearly establish that the notes for $45,000 
and $6,000 were not due until March 1, 1976, contrary to the 
allegations contained in the respondent's complaint. (R. 110-111) 
For the reasons set forth in Point I above and because the 
payment of the $115,000 note was tied to the other notes, 
the appellants believe that it too was due "on or before" 
March 1, 1976 and was thus not due and owing on January 2, 
1976. 
The only basis that the respondent could have for 
declaring the notes due would be the assertion that the 
notes were in default. Paragraph 8 of the Security Agreement 
dated July 3, 1975 sets forth the grounds for the declaration 
of default. (R. 124). Although the Conclusions of Law 
flatly state that "the plaintiff did exercise good faith in 
accelerating said payments and all notes are in default and 
due and payable in full," (R. 4 7) the only speci.fication of 
the grounds for the default which are found in .the Record on 
Appeal are set out in the plaintiff-respondent's Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Strike Demand for Jury Trial. {R. 
71) These are: 
ll) "Debtor fails to pay any of the Obligations 
when due;" 
(4) "Debtor becomes insolvent or unable to pay 
debts as they mature." 
~ . ;10) "Any of 
......__r materially 
the Collateral is lost, stolen, 
damaged;" 
-15-
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lll) "Bank shall deem itself insecure f 
reason whatsoever. 11 or any 
As explained above, ground #1 and the second h 
alf of i4 are 
inapplicable because the obligations did not become due 
until March 1, 1976, the date of maturi"ty of the notes. The 
first part of #4 cannot reasonably be advanced by th 
e res-
pondent because the defendants-appellants were more insolv 
on January 2, 1976 than they were when the notes were exe-
cuted. It was always known by the Bank that the appellants 
were heavily financed for the purpose of expanding and 
establishing their mink ranch. The Bank acknowledged that 
they knew in July of 1975 that the Woolseys were indebted 
and that this would be the last year that the Bank-would 
carry them. (R. 294-295). 
Subparagraph (10) of the default provision states that 
the debtor shall be in default if "any of the collateral is 
lost, stolen or materially damaged." While the appellants 
admit that some 968 mink pelts were stolen in late December 
of 1975, they believe that the facts will demonstrate the 
unreasonableness of employing this provision as the basis 
for a default. This allegation is based on the following 
facts: pursuant to the requirements of Paragraph 6 of the 
Security Agreements, 1 all of the stolen pelts were insurea 
This paragraph reads as follows: 6. INSURANCE: Debtor 
agreed, at his expense, to insure the Collateral against 1 
damage, theft (and such other risk as Bank may requir~) to. 
the full insurable value therof with insurance companies an: 
under policies and in form satisfactory to Bank. Proceeds 
insurance shall be payable to Bank as its interest may ap 
and all policies shall provide for 10 days minimum writ~ 
cellation notice to Bank. Upon request, policies or cer 
attesting, the coverage shall be deposited with Bank. I 
proceeds may be applied by Bank toward payment of any 
Obligations, whether or not due, in such order of app 
as Bank may determine. 
-16-
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and the Bank knew that its interests were insured and that 
the insurance payments would be made to the Bank. (.R, 139 
and 355). Because the theft of the insured pelts in no way 
diminished the value of the secured property, the Bank cannot 
use this as a valid basis to declare the notes in default 
and accelerate their payment. This is in accordance with 
the general rules of equity which apply to these Code provision 
as well as all others. U.C.A. §78-1-103. 
The only real issue which was addressed at trial and in 
the other hearings was whether the Bank could validly accelerate 
the notes by reason of the insecurity provision contained 
in Subparagraph lll) of the Default par.agraph. in the Securit:y 
Agreement. That provision states that default may be4eclared 
if the "Bank shall deem itself insecure for any reason 
whatsoever". For the following reasons, the appellants 
believe that the Bank had no valid basis under this pro-
vision to accelerate this payments due under the notes and 
that its actions in attempting to do so evidence a lack of 
the required good faith. 
The provisions of the Commercial Code Title of the Utah 
Code superimpose a duty of good faith on the arbitrary right 
of a secured party to accelerate note payments due to insecurity. 
This provision is found in U.C.A. §70A-l-208. This statute 
reads as follows: 
A term providing that one party or his successor 
in interest may accelerate payment. or.performance 
or require collateral or additio~al coll~tera~ •at 
will" or "when he deems himself insecure or in 
words or similar import shall be construed to mean 
that he shall have power to do so only if he in 
good faith believes that the prospect of payment 
or performance is impaired. The burden of estab-
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, 
lishing lack of good faith is on the party against 
whom the power has been exercised. 
The purposes of this language is clearly stated by this 
Comment of the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code: 
'!he increased use of acceleration clauses either 
in the case of sales on credit or in time paper 
or in security transactions has lead to some con-
fusion in the cases as to the effect to be given 
to a clause which seemingly grants the power of an 
acceleration at the whim and caprice of one party 
This section is intended to make clear that despite 
language which can be so construed and. which fur-
ther might be held to make the agreement void as 
against public policy or to make the contract 
illusory or too indefinite for enforcement, the 
clause means that the option is to be. exercised 
only in the good faith belief that the prospect 
of payment or performan~e is .impaired. (Emphasis 
added). 
This Court has recently interpretted §70A-l-208 for~ 
first. time in the case of Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P .2d 
1145 (1976}. Appellants believe that the trial court igno1 
the holding and rationale of this case and, in so doing, 
reached an inequitable result that has achieved the harsh 
results that the Williamson decision had hoped to avoid. 
Appellants believe that the present case is very similar io 
many aspects to the Williamson case and that the holding an 
rules of that decision should have been applied in the tria 
of this case. A review of that decision will reveal the 
incorrectness of the trial court's rulings. 
In the Williamson decision, this Court recognized the 
harshness of acceleration clauses without notice: 
The clause which allows for acceleration in case 
of default, if strictly enforced, is ~ ~eve7e co-
venant the invocation of which has similarity 
to oth~r forfeitures. The imposition of such severe 
conditions is not favored in the law; and the one~, 
who seeks to impose them must not, ei.ther by acts 
. -18-
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or omission permit another to assume that. the cove-
nant will not be strictly enforced, then "crack 
down" on the obligor by rigidly insisting on en-
forcement, without giving some reasonable notice 
and opportunity to comply. This is a doctrine of 
equity which is firmly established in our law by 
numerous decisions. 545 P.2d at 1147. 
This Court noted that these severe sanctions have long been 
disfavored under Utah law and noted the case of Jensen v. Nielsen, 
26 U.2d 96, 485 P.2d 673 (1971) and other cases cited therein 
as ample support for that proposition. In the present case, 
the Bank accelerated the note without notice and obtained 
the appointment of a receiver ex parte, thus causing ir-
reparable harm to the appellants and precluding the appellants 
from obtaining financing from other sources, thus· effectively 
destroying the defendants' lifesavings and an investment of 
many years duration which has now been dismantled and sold 
at far less than market value due to ineffective management 
by the receivers which were appointed pursuant to the Bank's 
request. The testimony at trial clearly established that 
the appellants had made arrangements for additional.financing 
from Mr. Harvey Carson and others and that the premature and 
unexpected attachment by the Bank destroyed any of these 
possibilities. (R. 360, 394, 422) 
In interpretting the good faith requirements of u.c.A. 
§70A-l-208, this Court made the following statement: 
It seems to recognize that acceleration is a 
harsh remedy which should be allowed only if 
there is some reasonable justification for doing 
so, such as a good faith belief that the pros-
pect of payment is impaired. 545 P.2d at 1149. 
In the present case, appellants assert that no valid basis 
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existed for the acceleration of the notes. Mr. Calvin 
Swenson, the Bank's president, admitted in the hearing on 
January 16, 1976, that the Bank was "principally concerned' 
with the theft (R. 137) but he and his counsel openly ackn~ 
that the stolen mink were insured (R. 139-140, and 355) and 
the trial court found that this fact was not disputed, (R, 
355) Because the stolen pelts were insured, the Bank cannm 
assert this as a valid basis for. feeling insecure and 
because the Bank has now received the insurance proceeds, it 
can hardly be heard to rebut this argument. All of the 
other bases were similarly improper: the Campbell mink wen 
fed by feed supplied by Campbell (R. 385, 409); no ~vidence 
was ever introduced to support the findings that defendant 
Ralph Woolsey threatened bankruptcy; the marital problems ol 
the defendants were admitted to have been known prior wili 
execution of the July, 1975 loans (R. 292); and the clear 
weight of the evidence showed. that defendant Ralph Woolsey 
was caring for his mink ranch in a good husbandry fashion 
at all times. (R. 166-169, 174-175, 386, 418 and 453) All I 
of these allegations appear to have been manufactured after 
the original allegations were ascertained to be unsupportiw 
of the insecurity allegations. All of this testimony reve 
that the trial court erred in appointing the receivers and 
in issuing the findings that it did. These actions were iD 
direct opposition to the direction of this court in the 
Williamson decision when it spoke of equitable principles 
and guidelines: 
The rules of equity arose as a means of avoid-
ing or ameliorating the rigidities and harsh-
-20-
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nes~ of some of the rules and remedies of law. 
It is also to be observed that the differences 
between law and equity are not so distinct as 
they were in former times. The lines between 
them have become blurred and they have become 
for the most part blended together in what we 
refer to generally as equity and justice. our 
Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 19, provided: 
"There shall be but one form of civil action, 
and law and equity may be administered in the 
same action." 
Consistent with the foregoing, equitable 
claims or defenses may be asserted. and tried 
along with or against legal claims or defenses 
in the same action; and equitable principles may 
be applied in an action at law. We can see no 
reason why the doctrine we have just spoken of 
as being rooted in equity and good conscience 
should have any affinity for, or limitation in 
application to, any particular type. of conduct 
or controversy. The principles or equity and 
justice are universal; they apply wherever ap-
propriate and necessary to enforce .rights or to 
prevent oppression and injustice. (Emphasis 
added) 545 P.2d at 1148. 
A last comment must be made concerning the lack of a 
demand for payment in this matter. As the trial testimony 
showed, the defendants had arranged for financing from other 
sources. (R. 360, 394 and 422) The ex parte action of the 
plaintiff in having a receiver appointed destroyed these 
arrangements and caused irrevocable harm. This is contrary 
to direction of this Court in the Williamson decision: 
The question arises as to how the defendants 
would know that condition came about unless 
someone so advised them. It is generally true 
that if there is a condition to be fulfilled, of 
which one party would be aware and the other 
would not, it is regarded as fair and proper 
that the one who knows should be obliged to no-
tify the other party affected thereby, and give 
him a reasonable opportunity to react thereto. 
545 P.2d at 1149. 
If the trial court had acted equitably and pursuant to this 
Court's directions, such damage would probably have been 
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avoided, 
This standard of "good faith" ha• been applied ~ 
jurisdictions as well. See e.g. Klin biel v. Conunercial C 
Corp. Inc., 8 u.c.c. Rep. 1099 (_10th Cir. 1971) ;. and Ku kai 
Morey, 541 P.2d 740 (_Alas.1975) in which the Alaska Suprerre 
Court makes the following statement: 
However, as a minimun requirement for the en-
forcement of such a provision, the party in-
voking the clause must reasonably and in good 
faith believe that the prospect of payment or 
performance has somehow been impaired. 
545 P.2d at 1149. 
These decisions are in agreement with this Court's decisioo 
in Williamson. Because the testimony at trial clearly 
showed that the respondent Bank had acted wrongfuHy and 
without justification in declaring itself insecure and 
accelerating the notes, the appellants believe that the 
trial court erred when it ruled that the appellants had not 
sustained the burden of .proof under U.C.A. §70A-l-208. 
Therefore, the appellants believe that the Findings of 
Fact Numbers 2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 and 
Conclusions of Law Numbers 1, 21 6 and 10, were contrary to 
the clear weight of the evidence at trial and they respect· 
fully ask this court to reverse these Findings and Con-
clusions and to enter judgment for the appellants. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING TESTIMONY FROMT~ 
RECORD CONCERNING FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT IN THE FORMATION 
THE SECURITY AGREEMENT WHICH ASSIGNED MRS. WOOLSEY'S rmE 
IN A HOME IN PROVO. 
-22-
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As additional security for the $115,000 loan which was 
made to the appellants in June of 1974, Mrs. Sylvia Woolsey 
assigned her interest in a home in Provo, Utah. This pro-
perty is described on the assignment of contract attached 
to the respondent's complaint and in the third Finding of Fact 
in this matter. (R. 119, 45). This home was awarded to Mrs. 
Woolsey as part of.the divorce settlement of a previous 
marriage. 
During the course of the hearings and trial of this 
matter, the appellants introduced a great deal of temtimoay 
to show that Mrs. Woolsey's home was mortgaged.pursuant to 
statements by Mr. Swenson that the mortgage was only necessary 
to make the loan look good to the bank examiners, that tlae Jteiak 
really didn't need the house, that there was no.way that her 
interest in the home would be jeopardized, and that the Bank 
had not made a practice of foreclosing on people's hames. (a. 
458-466, 342-346). For a synopsis of appellants' testimony in 
this regard, see the answers to the respondent's interro9atory 
*l, dated January 23, 1976 (R. 85-88), which answer is fouad 
in the Record on Appeal at pages 76 to 78. 
In her counterclaim, the appellant, Sylvia .Woolsey, , .;~O ,., 
specifically pled all of the facts set forth above and all.egecl · 
that such acts were intentional and constituted fraudulent 
misrepresentation. (R. 59, 98-99). In spite of these allegations 
and the specific representations by counsel at a hearing (R. 
238-241, 244-245), the Court ruled that such evidence was an 
attempt to vary the terms of a written contract and therefore 
violative of the parol evidence rule. The appellants believe 
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that this ruling was clearly erroneous 
It is manifestly clear under Utah case law that evi 
to show fraud in the inducement for execution of a cont ract 
other written document is admissible as an exception to~ 
parol evidence rule. The case of Mawhinney v. Jensen, llo 
142, 232 P.2d 769 (1951) ruled that parol evidence is alwa~ 
admissible to show fraud, even though it has the effect of 
varying the terms of the written contract. This decisionu 
in line with decisions of other states which have ruled on 
matter. See e.g. Davies v. Courtney, 11 Ariz.App. 248, 46J 
P.2d 554 (1970); Smith v. Kalavitz, 515 P.2d 473 (Colo.197ll 
Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Construction, Inc. 54-1 P,2d 
1184 (Ida. 1975); Ruff v. Boltz, 252 Ore. 236, 448 P.2d54! 
(1968); and Northern State Construction Co. v. Robbins, 76 
2d 357, 457 P.2d 187 (1969). All of these cases. stand for 
rule previously cited and refelct the fairness of allowin91 
party on opportunity to show that the terms or enforcement 
of an agreement may be unjust because they were obtained 
fraudulent means. 
Without getting to the merits of whether or not' the 
acts of the bank constituted fraud, the appellants believe 
that the order of the trial court (described above) was cl 
erroneous. The court was required to consider that test' 
and make a finding on the issue of fraud. It is patently 
that such evidence was not inadmissible as violative of the 
parol evidence rule. 
For the reasons set forth above, the appellants ask 
court to reverse the third Conclusion 
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trial court in this matter (R. 47) and to remand the matter 
to the trial court for a determination of this issue by a 
jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants believe that the trial judge committecl : . 
several prejudicial errors during the course of this litiga~~: 
In striking the appellants' request for a jury trial, tbe . ~:~/ 
deprived them of the right to have the issues of .fact .i-e- \"' 
:·~ ·- f,,f. 
solved by a jury of their peers, a right which is ...,m'(il.: 
,i._1 ... ~·-~ _.,, ,;,:.-.,·,_' 
by the Constitution and statutes of this state •. •••flie: "' 
' ... ·,,_,.~ 
questions of fact were thepredominant issues at tsia].# 
., .. ~ '.'.'.~,,~-­
trial judge had no discretion to deny the appell~" "" 
trial which had been properly requested. 
committed prejudicial error by striking. the test:.hlal.r', 
fraud in the making of a written agreement. sucib teet:f,liiM 
is 
be required to enter a finding on that issue. 
··~' ,\~~ 
The appellants also assert that several finclillf!lllil' . 
-~":?°" 
trial court are against the clear weight of the eY.&M11m"""' 
set forth herein, the evidence clearly showed that ~- · 
had made an oral agreement 
note to March 1, 1976, and .that the respondent's 
of that and others on the grounds of default was done 
faith and has resulted in irreparable 
For these reasons, the .appellants ask 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
to enter judgment in their favor or, in the alternative, to 
remand this matter to the trial court for further hearin911 on 
-25-
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this matter before a jury. 
DATED at Provo, Utah, this 
--for: 
& PETERSEN 
Defendants-
MAILED two copies of the foregoing Brief to Heber Grant 
Ivins, 75 North Center, American Fork, Utah 84003, this 
/ (.,..f:/,,._ day. of November, 1976. 
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